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ARGUMENT
The Appellee brief presented three arguments for this court to uphold or affirm
Appellant's conviction: First, "[t]he evidence established Schwenke's Guilt for Securities
Fraud"; Second, "[t]his court should not consider Schwenke's unpreserved challenge to expert
testimony regarding the characteristics of stock", and Third, "Schwenke's prosecutorial
misconduct and Constitutional claims fail because the prosecutor accurately charged and argued
the law". These arguments are addressed here next.
L

The evidence did not establish Schwenke was guilty of Securities Fraud.
A. The alleged offer, sale and purchase of securities.

The Court is urged to note that all the cases cited by the government are civil cases
construing the Federal Security and Exchange laws. The government failed to cite one case that
was decided based on Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1 or any statute similar thereto. The
government started its argument by claiming that "economic reality" test promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) does not apply to
the case at hand. Instead, the government claims that the Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth/ 471

1

"This case presents the question whether the sale of all of the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject

to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the Acts)." Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, at
683.
5

U.S. 681 (1985) is ccn^oilin: ;>:v: &c rj • -•• <•-. ui J .ir\: v that case to hold that the American
Daity.com stock involved in this case is a security under the Utah criminal statute. The

must be disregarded. The Landreth case is a civil case construing the Federal Securities Law, not
the Utah criminal law that Schwenke was convicted under. To review Schwenke's felony
cri minal con v ictioii against a much lesser standard of a ci \;il

• >• is inherently ' i infair t >ecause it

i :::' luces the governments burden to sustain U>* criminal con\iction.
More.',-..: :-L .;XIK o: , \r..-:c„:. . •„..•• ..,::. in .his case and the facts and. circumstances
surrounding the ownership b^ iVir. Young and Air. \U^rs of block certificates are clearly not
comparable to the transaction in Lan_drcth Thr. :• the Landreth family owned all the outstanding
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and out of state, 1 he issue then* was whether or no! the stork of ihe l^iiber business was
"security'' under the anti-fraud provisions Gi v^ J-edcu. NcLunucs Laws.
The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged that "the fact that instruments bear
the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts." Landreth Timber

instruments possess "some of the significant characteristics typically associated with" stock, id.,
at *

. recognizing :;V.L when .:n instrument r< joli; cal-^ ' >. >ck and bears stock's usual

characteristics, "a pwchaser justifiably una- :*:: -^urne that the Fe.:/rnl ^ - -v\uc^! -vs mob ' '
6

at 850. We identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the
ability to be picd^u o.- irypoJiCituiu, M\J U}C U iil^Ting. ul w)tiiif; rights M \dc\y ru^.. ^ u:^
ber of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. *fn2 Id -n - ^ 1." A/
(Emphasis added). Against this backdrop, the Supreme

L
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family lumber business was security for purposes of the anti-fraud provisions of the Federal
Securities Laws because the stock was marketed by in and out of state brokers and the stock had
the characteristics (set forth abo\ e) usuall) associated "\ v itli comm • ^ ••.-*
In Landreth, after the purchase of the timber business, the buyers soon discovered that the
mill did not live up to their expectation. Hie rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates and the
lie w components ti lrned 01 it

\:: •• *x

<. i ^: n a equipment. Eventually the

buyers sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. The buyers then filed a "suit seeking
rescission of the sale , siock and $2,500,000 1 ti damages, alleging uuii ^ ^\»\v.- -u- - ... •

-

widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq. (1933 Act)." Id at 684 Buyers "also alleged that respondents
[Sell' r<?! hac iegl:_- :nli\ oi :.uenn \iali> made .nisrepr^sentauon-- and ha.. fail :d ro stale ;.naterk;;
facts as to the worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 15 U S. C § ' 78a et seq. (1934 ,/ let) ' : Id
None of the civil claims in Landreth have any relevance or similarity to the criminal
:

1

charges involved in this case. Yet the government is urging the court to apply the Landreth case
as controlling in this case. More importantly, the facts of the case are not even close. The
government witnesses testified and confirmed that it was a new corporation set up for the farmers
which they, as the only two shareholders, wholly owned - no "stock" of the corporation was sold,
issued, etc. American Dairy.com was not an existing and ongoing corporation that was selling its
stock.
There was no evidence that Schwenke owned an ongoing corporation and he sold his
stock in the corporation in violation of the anti-fraud provision of the Federal Securities and
Exchange Act. There was no evidence that American Dairy.com stock provided that right to
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits because there was no evidence of
profits or that it could have profits. The two stock certificates reflected only the interest the two
farmers had in their closely held corporation. There was no evidence that the American
Dairy.com stock could be pledged or hypothecated. Both Mr. Young and Mr. Myers knew that
American Dairy.com stock had no value, and without any value, there is no chance that it could
be pledged or hypothecated. Lastly, the American Dairy.com stock had no capacity to appreciate
in value unless a sufficient number of farmers joined with a minimum of cows to make American
Dairy.com viable to register an initial public offering. The evidence is clear that both Mr. Young
and Mr. Myers knew, and had no misunderstanding, that an initial public offering was a goal well
into the future when many farmers with many cows join the company. There is simply no
g

comparison between American Dairy.com and the Landreth Timber corporation.
The government next claimed that Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) confirms
that Landreth standard should be applied to this case. Yet Reves is further removedfromthis
case because it involved the issue of whether a "note" as opposed to "stock" is a security?2 There
an agricultural cooperative ("co-op") had approximately 23,000 members. To raise money to
support its general business operations, the co-op sold uncollateralized and unsecured demand
notes to members and non-members of the co-op. In its advertisements for the notes, the co-op
newsletter read in part: "YOUR CO-OP has more than $11,000,000 in assets to stand behind
your investments. The Investment is not Federally [sic] insured but it is . . . Safe . . . Secure . . .
and available when you need it." Despite the assurances, the co-op filed for bankruptcy in 1984.
The co-op had approximately 1600 members hold $10 million in notes when it filed for
bankruptcy. A class of the note holders filed a civil lawsuit against the accounting firm alleging,
inter alia, that it failed to follow generally accepted accounting principals in its audit and
charging that the accounting firm had violated the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act as well as
the Arkansas's securities laws. How the Reves case could be controlling or even persuasive in

2

"This case presents the question whether certain demand notes issued by the Farmers Cooperative of Arkansas

and Oklahoma (Co-Op) are "securities" within the meaning of § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Reves v Ernst & Young, at 56
9

this criminal prosecution boggles the mind. But that is what is before the court. The government
is desperately grabbing onto anything to try and justify the Schwenke's frivolous prosecution.
This court is urged to do what is right and vacate and reverse Appellant's frivolous conviction.
B.

Alleged failure to disclose material facts.

The government started off by citing City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v.
Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 669 (6th Cir. 2005) for the proposition that "In order to be
actionable,.. .[an] omission must pertain to material information that the defendant had a duty to
disclose". The government also cited Basic Inc. v. Levinsoru 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988)
quoting "Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading". The Court is urged to please note
once again that the government is presenting a civil case construing Federal Security and
Exchange law3 that is very broad and expansive without any comparison to the very restricted

3

"In this appeal, we review the district court's dismissal with prejudice of a securitiesfraudclass action

Consolidated Complaint ("Complaint")filedby investors in Bridgestone Corporation ("Bridgestone") against
Bridgestone, its subsidiary Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. ("Firestone"), Bridgestone Chief Executive Officer ("CEO")
Yoichiro Kaizaki, and Bridgestone Executive Vice President and Firestone CEO Masatoshi Ono. The district court
dismissed the claims against Kaizaki for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed the claims against Bridgestone,
Firestone and Ono for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand." City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v. Bridgestone Corp.. at
651.
10

"This case requires us to apply the materiality requirement Of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of

and limited scope of the State criminal state that is before the court in this case.
It is not clear why the government quotedfromthese civil cases, but what is clear is that
the cases supported the failure of the prosecution to establish a case. Under the plain meaning of
Section 61-1-1, Sehwenke's duty to disclose is limited to material facts necessary to make any
misleading statements actually made by him, not misleading. Section 61-1-1 does not impose a
duty, as claim by the government, to disclose all information a reasonable investor would want to
know. The Bridgestone case citing Levinson and others stated very clearly what it will take for
a misrepresentation or omission to be actionable under a Rule 10b-5 (Federal Securities Law
civil suit, not Utah Section 61-1-1 criminal prosecution):

1934,48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq. (1934 Act), and the Securities and Exchange Commissions
Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, see 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1987), in the content of preliminary corporate merger
discussions. We must also determine whether a person who traded a corporation's shares on a securities exchange
after the issuance of a materially misleading statement by the corporation may invoke a rebuttable presumption that,
in trading, he relied on the integrity of the price set by the market." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, at 226
11

In order to be actionable, a misrepresentation or omission must pertain to material
information that the defendant had a duty to disclose, two significant limitations
to the general policy of disclosure. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 ("[I]n order to
prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the statements were not
enough that a statement is false or incomplete., if the misrepresented fact is
otherwise insignificant misleading as to a material fact. It is .") (emphasis in
original omitted); In Re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,1432
(3d Cir. 1997) (M[T]here is no general duty on the part of a company to provide the
public with all material information."). As this Court has recognized, this set of
requirements preserves the healthy limits on a public corporation's "duty to
disclose all information[,] even colorably material," because corporations might
otherwise "face potential second-guessing in a subsequent disclosure suit," a
regime that would threaten to "deluge investors with marginally useful
information, and would damage corporations' legitimate needs to keep some
information non-public." Sofamor Danek, 123 F.3d at 403 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). A duty to affirmatively disclose "may arise when there is
insider trading, a statute requiring disclosure," or, as relevant to this case, "an
inaccurate, incomplete or misleading prior disclosure." In re Digital Island Sec.
Litig., 357 F.3d 322,329 n.10 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).
Bridgestone, supra, para. 76 (Emphasis added)
As Bridgestone illustrates, even under a civil proceeding, the government must establish
that Schwenke had a duty to disclose and that duty may arise in insider trading, a statute or from
inaccurate, incomplete or misleading prior statement. The statute in this case, Section 61-1-1
requires the government to establish the misleading prior statement made by Schwenke. Absent
from the government's case is any misleading statements made by Schwenke. In the Appellee
brief the government failed to point to any misleading statements made by Schwenke but instead
claims that".. .the prosecutor pointed out to the jury during closing argument, R.4:404-10
Schwenke told Myers and Young that the American Dairy.com stock would be offered to the
12

public pursuant to an initial public offering (IPO), which was represented as the "foundation" of
the plan. R.3:127,141-42; R.4:228, 236-37." Appellee Brief, pages 23 and 24. Obviously, what
the prosecutor argues to the jury is not evidence. But even assuming there was discussion of an
IPO, the evidence was clear that Schwenke was not selling an IPO. The plan was to recruit dairy
farmers to join American Dairy.com, and only when enough farmers join, with at least 10,000 to
15, 000 cows, would there be an effort to pursue an IPO. See TT pp.121-122,174-176 and 257258. Also see Appellant Brief pages 23 and 24. Mr. Young and Mr. Myers' farm was the first
and only farm that joined and it had less than 200 cows. Given the 10,000 to 15,000 cow target
(TT pp.121-122, Appellant Brief page 23) before consideration of an IPO, at the time of the
transaction charged in this case, an IPO was not even a consideration. This fact was confirmed
by Mr. Myers at trial:
Q:[SCHWENKE] So you agree, then, there was intention or at least part of
the plan is to have more than one dairy?
A: [MYERS] Oh definitely. I mean there was no way the stock would ever be
worth anything with just our dairy alone.
Q: [SCHWENKE] You testified here earlier that it was only intended for your
dairy to go public.
A: [MYERS] No, no, no. If that was the impression, that's false
Q:[SCHWENKE] In fact-A: [MYERS] It would - - to do a public offering, it would have been that the stock
was going to go. It wasn't that my dairy was going to a public off - - the
American Dairy.com stock. When value that that American Dairy had
would have been what would have gone public, in my opinion. I don't understand
stock.
Q:[SCHWENKE] You do believe then that was something that was an
objective to accomplish in the future that somehow we would hope that by
sometime in the future we would have enough cows, enough farms joining
13

the corporation here, then we'll look into going into a public offering; is that
correct?
A:[MYERS] Yes
Q: [SCHWENKE] So this idea of the IPO was something that would happen - would take place under this plan only after there's enough farmers join the
corporation; is that correct?
A:
[MYERS] That would be cor - - that would be correct.
See T.pp. 257-258. (Emphasis added) See also, Appellant Brief page 24.
The transaction in this case is not an IPO. Yet, the government insists that Schwenke
should have made disclosures in connection with an IPO. Without agreeing that the
government's version of the disclosures required for an IPO are correct, Appellant can state
categorically that he had no duty under the Section 61-1-1 to make such alleged IPO disclosures
such as "risk, capitalization, distribution, commissions to be paid, background of principals and
control persons involving in the issuing company". The evidence is clear that there was no sale
of a security and there was no IPO and the government's case fails, and Schwenke's wrongful
conviction must be reversed.
Finally, in its desperate effort to make a case against Schwenke, the government claims
that its case "did not rest only on allegations of material omissions", but also on an untrue
statement made by Schwenke. The government claims that Schwenke lied that he had
$10,000,000.00 in assets to invest to pay Mr. Young and Mr. Myers' dairy farm debts. The
statement is false because American Dairy.com had no financial documents, no bank accounts,
and no assets and it was essentially a paper entity. Moreover, proof that Schwenke did not have
14

any money was when he failed to pay for the additional cows. Assuming arguendo that
Schwenke made such a statement, there was no evidence that Schwenke did not have the alleged
assets, and more importantly, there was no evidence that Schwenke had a legal duty to pay Mr.
Young and Mr. Myers' dairy farm debts. Significantly, if Schwenke had made such an oral
promise, the promise should have merged into the written agreement entered into by the parties
on August 9,2000. Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck, 354 P.2d 559, (Utah 1960). The same is
also true with respect to the alleged promise to pay for 200 cows that Mr. Young ordered for the
dairy. The only conclusion the court can reach in this case is that Schwenke did not make any
untrue statements and he did not make any misleading statements that could be made, not
misleading, with about 20 omissions the government presented to the jury resulting on
Schwenke's conviction.
II.

The Court should exclude improper expert testimonies of the Government
Employee, Michael Hines.

The government urges the Court to reject the plain and undeniable impermissible legal
opinion provided by its employee as an expert, Mr. Michael Hines. The government does not
deny the improper testimony but asked the Court to exclude it because it was not properly
preserved, Appellant has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances, and the testimony
actually comports with Rule 702. Appellee Brief, pages 28 and 29. None of the government's
claims for the Court to ignore the impermissible legal opinion has any merits.
First, the government described Mr. Harmon's objection to the line of questions as not
15.

clear enough to give notice that he was objecting to the improper impartial expert testimony of
the government employee, Mr. Hines. Contrary to the government description, Mr. Harmons'
objection was timely as to all the testimony that follows the denial of the objection which
included testimonies from pages 283 through and including 288. Second, even assuming
arguendo that counsel failed to object properly, the issue before the Court is a question of law.
State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19,23 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). As a question of law, the Court could rule
on the issue, de novo, without deference to the trial court. If the appellate court could rule on a
question of law without deference to the trial court, it certainly could do so even if the issue was
not raised or ruled upon by the trial court.
The impermissible alleged expert testimony of the government's employee is plain error
that should be reviewed even if it was not raised below. "To establish plain error and to obtain
appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, Defendant must show that
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
[Defendant]."" State v. AlfatlawL 153 P.3d 804, 2006 UT App 511 (Utah App. 12/21/2006)
citing State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,f 16,122 P.3d 543 (quotations and citation omitted); see also
State v. Powell 872 P.2d 1027,1031 (Utah 1994).
The transcript of the trial is filled with improper legal opinion testimonies by Mr. Hines, a
government employee testifying as an expert for the government. But only one incident is cited
16

in the Appellant brief as an example. See Appellant Brief, pages 26 to 30. The incident cited is
an undisputed improper legal opinion that the stock involved in this case is a security.
Accordingly, an error does exist. The next inquiry is whether or not the error should have been
obvious to the trial court. The Supreme Court explained that the plain error test is two-pronged.
State of Utah v. Julie Warren Verde. 770 P.2d 116,101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (1989):
First, the error must be "plain" or "manifest." This is sometimes termed an
"obviousness" requirement. After examining the record, an appellate court must
be able to say "that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was
committing error." *fiil 1 Id. at 9. Second, the error must be of sufficient
magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party. In other words, applying
the standard we explained in State v. Knight 734 P.2d at 919, the appellant must
show a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome below would have
been more favorable. *fhl2
Id, (Emphasis added). Any review of the record will clearly show the error. Accordingly, the
error is plain in conformity with the plain error standard.
The second prong under Julie Warren Verde is the same as the third element provided for
under Alfatlawi above which is, the "error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [Defendant]" Assuming arguendo that defense
counsel, Mr. Harmon, actually failed to object and preserve the issue of the improper legal
opinion, the harm to Schwenke is definite and sure. There is no question that absent the error,
the entire improper testimony of Mr. Hines should have been keptfromthe jury. Without
improper legal opinion testimony that American Dairy.com stock was "security" a conviction
would have been unlikely. Accordingly, the Court is respectfully urged to review the claim
17

against Mr. Hine's improper legal testimony because failure to do so would result in manifest
injustice and to reverse the wrongful conviction on this ground as well
III.

The Constitutional claims are valid and should be considered by the court.
A.

The government argues that the Constitutional claim was not preserved.

To make its claim that the Constitutional claim was not preserved, the government first
classified the claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct, then argued that Schwenke did not object
at trial; he therefore, failed to preserve this issue. Schwenke; however, did not consider the
government's error in its theory of the case as prosecutorial misconduct. The government
throughout its case, through counsel and primarily through its employee Michael Hines as its
expert witness argued that Schwenke had a duty to disclose all the facts a reasonable prudent
investor would want to know. Mr. Hines repeated at least a half a dozen times through his
testimonies the same theme that once Schwenke offers American Dairy.com stock he was
"requirefd] the disclosure of all material facts ..." TT pp 92-93. But this was error in the
government's theory, not misconduct, unless the government knowingly and deliberately
misstated the law.
The government's error exist and was plain because a cursory review of the record will
reveal the error. Finally, the error is harmful because but for the error Schwenke may not have
been convicted of security fraud.

IS

B.

The Information and Preliminary Hearing did not provide notice of the
case that was actually presented to the jury,

Schwenke was charged with violation of Section 61-1-1 which required the state to prove
that he made misleading statements of material facts but omitted to make statements of material
facts that would make the misleading material facts, not misleading. At trial, Schwenke was
charged with failing to disclose all the material facts a reasonable prudent investor would want to
know. These are two vastly different charges. The government's charging and proof errors exist
and were plain because a cursory review of the record will reveal the errors. Finally, the error is
harmful because but for the error Schwenke may not have been convicted of security fraud
C.

The Constitution violations of due process and separation of powers are
plain errors.

The Constitutional violations of due process and separation of power are plain errors for
the same reasons as set forth under Section A and B.
IV.

The evidence of the Loan, the Purchase of Cows and Initial Public Offering are
not relevant to the agreement that was completed long before any of these matters
came about.

It's unfortunate that the court denied remand to establish the evidence of the loan which
would have established that the loan, which Mr. Young denied knowing anything about, was a
loan that was taken out for Mr. Young's dairy. He received $7,000.00 of the proceeds and the
balance of the proceeds ($5,500.00) was paid on a $15,000.00 bill from the company to facilitate
the cleaning, construction, painting, installation of a web server, creation of a website, and
19

installation of computers and cameras throughout so the dairy could be viewed on the internet.
The government presented a picture that Schwenke stole $50,000.00 from Mr. Young and Mr.
Myer's dairy when the truth was that Young and Myer's dairy received it all. The Court is
respectfully referred to Appellant Brief pages 38 to 49.
CONCLUSION
The four arguments presented by the government in opposition to the reversal of
Schwenke's wrongful conviction are all without merits. The government's claim that the
transaction involves the offer, sale and purchase of security is without support because there was
no security. The government has no logical support for its claim that the "economic reality" test
is not applicable here. The economic reality test is clearly applicable here because of the unique
nature of the transaction where the stock was used primarily to reflect the interest of each
participating farmer and the stock had none of the normal characteristics of common stock as an
investment instrument. Moreover, there was no evidence of any misleading statements made by
Schwenke that could be made, not misleading, by any of the alleged omissions charged by the
government.
The government also did not deny that its employee that testified as its expert gave
impermissible legal opinion testimonies, rather it attempted to avoid the damage by claiming the
error was not preserved. The legal opinion testimony followed a timely objection thus preserving
it, but even if it was not, the impermissible legal opinion was a question of law and was plain
20

error that can still be reviewed. All of the other claims by the government of unpreserved issues
can all be reviewed as questions of law or plain errors.
For all the foregoing reasons, inter alia, Schwenke respectfully prays the honorable court
would reverse his wrongful conviction and order his immediate freedom.
Dated this ( 3 d a y of September 2009.

A. Paul Schwenke.
Appellant Pro Se
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